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There is surprisingly little macroeconomic empirical research which would 
support a presumed link between education and development. I identify three 
major reasons why it remains difficult to estimate the economic relevance of 
education as a determinant of growth and development. First, most empirical 
research has ignored some of the crucial productivity aspects of education as 
proposed by new growth models. Second, measuring the contribution of 
education to economic development has largely ignored international differences 
in rates of return and the quality of education. Third, the allocation of resources 
within the education sector usually does not follow considerations of efficiency, 
which implies that additional spending on education cannot be expected to 
produce substantial output effects. 
 
   1
I. Introduction 
Many recent contributions to the theory of economic growth and development 
have focused on the pivotal role of human capital formation. While human 
capital formation is a fairly encompassing concept in economic theory, most 
recent empirical contributions have focused on education as a readily available 
proxy for human capital. Despite the almost self-evident role of education in an 
explanation of microeconomic income differences, the macroeconomic role of 
education has remained elusive up to now. This state of affairs is very 
unsatisfactory from an economic policy point of view, not least because many 
national and international organizations consider the advancement of education 
as a proven recipe to overcome poverty and economic backwardness. 
 
In this paper, I briefly review the international empirical literature on the 
macroeeconomic link between education and economic development. Apart 
from purely statistical problems, I identify three major reasons why it remains 
difficult to estimate the economic relevance of education as a determinant of 
growth and development: 
•  Theory is much ahead of empirics in the macroeconomics of education. Most 
empirical research so far relies on rather traditional models of growth and 
development, which ignore some of the crucial aspects of the new growth 
models. 
•  Measuring the contribution of education to economic development has mainly 
relied on cross-country estimates of average years of education, which may be 
grossly inadequate if rates of return to investment in education or the quality 
of education differ substantially across countries (as they do). 
•  In almost all countries, the allocation of resources within the education sector 
obviously follows political mechanisms rather than economic considerations 
of efficiency, which implies that additional spending on education cannot be 
expected to produce substantial output effects without a reform of the 
underlying (inefficient) system itself. 
 
The next section summarizes the standard approach to estimating the 
macroeconomic role of education in growth by highlighting various possible 
specifications of the education variable. Section III reports what can be learned 
about the macroeconomic role of education from recent so-called development 
accounting studies, which are based on calibrating (instead of estimating) the 
key parameters of macroeconomic production functions. Both types of studies 
produce a broad range of results for the macroeconomic role of education which 
do not allow for a clear-cut assessment. Finally, section IV looks in greater 
detail into the sector which is assumed to produce a large fraction of the 
economy-wide human capital, namely the schooling sector. The somewhat 
depressing finding is that schooling productivity seems to have declined in a   2
number of developed and developing countries over the last 25 years or so. With 
a view on the implications of these findings for economic policies aiming to 
foster human capital formation, section V outlines directions for further 
research. 
II.  Modeling the Macroeconomic Productivity of Education 
Up to now, the human capital augmented neoclassical growth model has 
remained the workhorse of empirical research on the macroeconomic 
productivity of education. The model is fairly flexible because it allows for 
alternative specifications which can be adjusted to best match the available data 
at hand. Many specific versions of the model have been used in the empirical 
literature, but the underlying basic structure can be derived from no more than 
two slightly different production functions. 
Basic Equations to Identify the Macroeconomic Role of Human Capital 
One version of the neoclassical growth model considers human capital as an 
independent factor of production. Output at time t  is described as 
 
(1)  () () () () () () Yt Kt Ht AtLt =
− − αβ α β 1   , 
 
where the notation is standard: Y  is output, K is the stock of physical capital, 
H is the stock of human capital, A is the level of technology, and L is labor. A 
and  L are assumed to grow exogenously at rates g and n. This production 
function can be estimated in its structural form as  
 
(2)  ln( / ) ln ( ) ln( / ) ln( / ) YL A g t KL HL =+ + + 0 α β   , 
 
with  α  and β  as the production elasticities of physical and human capital. 
Assuming that constant fractions of output, sk and sh, are invested in physical 
and in human capital, and defining k  as the stock of physical capital per 
effective unit of labor (k K AL = / ) and, similarly, yYAL = /  and h H AL = / , 
the evolution of the economy is governed by 
 
(3a)  () () () ( ) & kt syt n g kt k =− + + δ , 
(3b)  () () () ( ) & ht s yt n g ht h =− + + δ , 
 
where the dot denotes absolute changes of the variables over time, and K  is the 
depreciation rate. The underlying assumption of this modeling framework is that 
the same production function applies to human capital, physical capital, and   3
consumption. Hence the depreciation rate is the same both for human and for 
physical capital. 
 
For decreasing returns to all capital (H I  1), equations (3a) and (3b) give the 
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Substituting equation (4a) and (4b) into the production function (1) by using the 
definitions for k and h, and taking logs, gives the reduced-form equation for the 
steady state level of output per worker as a function of the fraction of output 
invested in human capital (sh) and other variables such as the initial level of 
technology, the growth rate of technology, the fraction of output invested in 
physical capital, the growth rate of the labor force , and the depreciation rate: 
 
(5)  ln( / ) Y L t 



















ln( ) ng   . 
 
Approximating around the steady state, Mankiw et al. (1992) show that the 
growth rate of output per worker between some initial date 0 and time t can be 
described as a function of the above determinants of the steady state plus the 
initial level of output: 
 
(6)  ()() ln / ln / YL YL t − 0 
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δ ln ( ) () −− − 1 0 eY L t λ ln /   , 
 
where investment in human capital is again one of the right-hand-side variables 
and λ is the rate of convergence to the steady state. 
   4
An alternative way to identify the role of human capital in determining the level 
and the growth rate of output per worker is given by 
 
(7) ln( / ) Y L t 














δ   , 
 
which can be derived from solving equation (4b) for sh and substituting into 
equation (5). This equation uses a stock measure rather than a flow measure of 
human capital as a right-hand-side variable, and predicts different coefficients 
on the terms for investment in physical capital and for the growth of the labor 
force. Equation (7) can also be used to approximate around the steady state, 
similar to equation (6). 
 
In the second version, human capital is considered as being directly linked to 
labor and not as an independent factor of production, as recently suggested by 
Bils and Klenow (1998). If so, the initial production function (1) can be 
rewritten as 
 
(1.1)  ( ) Yt Kt AtLte school () () () () = α β
  , 
 
where school is a variable which measures the combined impact of the rate of 
return to investment in education r and the average number of years of schooling 
(S). This specification is inspired by the empirical microeconometric success of 
the so-called Mincer equation (Mincer 1974) and implies that human capital 
generated by schooling is given as 
 
(8)  Ht L te S
r S () () =⋅ ⋅   , 
 
Using equation (3a) as before, the evolution of capital intensity per effective 
worker is now given as 
 
(3.1.a)  ( ) & ks ke ng k k
school =− + + ⋅ α β δ   , 
 
implying that k converges to a steady state value k* which follows (see equation 
4a) as  
 
(4.1.a)  () []
( )
ki n v e n g school */
/
=+ + ⋅ − β α
δ
11
  . 
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Substituting (4.1.a) into the production function (1.1) and taking logs, output per 
worker equals 
 














δ  , 
 
which looks very similar to equation (8) except for the measure of human 
capital, which now does not enter in logarithmic form. 
 
This recapitulation of the basic structure of the most popular empirical growth 
models shows that even within a fairly narrow theoretical setting, there are many 
ways to estimate the macroeconomic role of human capital formation as 
measured by education. With perfect data, it should not matter whether stock or 
flow data are used: the implied estimate of β  should be the same in 
specifications like (2), (5), (6), and (7). But the available data are far from 
perfect. Hence empirical results are likely to differ depending on the 
specification used. In addition, the various specifications encounter different 
econometric problems with regard to endogeneity, multicollinearity, and 
measurement error, which also impact on the results (Gundlach 1999). 
Furthermore, results based on specifications (7) and (9) have to be interpreted 
differently although the regression coefficient on the human capital variable is 
predicted to be the same (and to be equal to 1 for constant returns to scale). 
 
Because of these statistical, econometric, and interpretational problems, it does 
not come as a big surprise that the estimates of the production elasticity of 
human capital reported in the literature differ widely. In the following, I review 
selected empirical results which allow for an identification of the production 
elasticity of human capital. This is not meant as a comprehensive review of the 
recent literature. The overview is only meant as an attempt to evaluate by 
statistical and economic criteria the broad range of empirical findings which 
have been produced on the basis of alternative specifications derived from the 
underlying production function. 
Empirical Estimates  
Depending on the availability of cross-sectional or time-series stock and flow 
data for physical and human capital, the macroeconomic role of education can 
be inferred from estimates of the regression coefficients on the human capital 
variables. There would be positive empirical evidence in favor of a 
macroeconomic productivity of education if the direct or implied estimate of ß 
in the above specifications resembles the share of human capital in factor 
income. 
   6
As a measure of reference, the share of human capital in factor income can be 
assessed by back-of-the-envelope calculations. One possibility is to consider the 
minimum wage as the return on labor with no education. Historically, the 
minimum wage has been 30 to 50 percent of the average wage in the United 
States. On this account, it would follow that the return to education equals about 
50 to 70 percent of labor income. And since labor income is about 70 percent of 
total factor income in the United States and other industrialized countries, the 
share of human capital in total factor income should be about 35 to 50 percent. 
 
The problem with this kind of benchmark estimate is that comparable data for 
other countries than the United States are difficult to come by. Especially in 
developing countries, the minimum wage is less enforced and less likely to be 
applicable, and solid data are harder to obtain in any case. An alternative 
possibility to derive a benchmark estimate is to focus on the estimated rate of 
return to education and on average years of schooling (as in equation (8)). If 
each year of schooling substantially raises a worker's income, it becomes 
possible to calculate the difference between incomes achieved with and without 
education. 
 
For the world as a whole, a social rate of return to secondary education of 13 
percent and an average of 8 years of schooling have been estimated 
(Psacharopoulos 1994). The income generating effect of schooling can be 
calculated as average years of schooling times the rate of return to schooling 
raised to the power of e. So for the world as a whole, one would conclude that 
the average worker earns about three times [e
801 3 ⋅ . ] as much as he would without 
any schooling. Therefore, the share of human capital in labor income should be 
about two thirds, as was suggested by the calculations based on the minimum 
wage. And the share of human capital in total factor income, as proxied by the 
production elasticity, should be estimated as about 45 percent in econometric 
studies. 
 
Lau et al. (1991) estimate a variant of the structural form of the production 
function (see equation (2)). They relate aggregate real GDP to physical capital 
stock, labor force, land, and average education of the labor force as a proxy for 
the stock of human capital. For a sample of developing countries, they find 
production elasticities of physical capital of about 60 percent, but relatively 
small production elasticities of human capital in the range of 2 percent for 
various specifications. Only if they allow for region specific effects, their 
estimates for the production elasticity of human capital increase to 20 percent 
for Latin America and East Asia. Also based on a variant of the structural form 
of the production function, Kim and Lau (1992) find production elasticities of 
physical capital for industrialized countries which are close to conventional 
factor shares. However, the estimated production elasticities of human capital   7
turn out to be rather small, covering a range from 10 percent (United States) to 
20 percent (Japan). 
 
In a rather influential study, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) use a first-difference 
version of the structural form of the production function (equation (2)) to 
estimate the role of human capital for a sample of industrialized and developing 
countries. They report that in such a specification, the regression coefficient on 
the change in average schooling years turns out to be statistically insignificant 
and sometimes even enters with a negative sign. In order to obtain a more 
positive role of human capital formation, they suggest an alternative growth 
model. In this new model, human capital externalities can be considered to be 
embodied in new physical capital (technology import) or in subsequent advances 
in knowledge, as suggested in the models of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). 
Their empirical results seem to suggest that the level of schooling, which enters 
with a statistically significant positive regression coefficient, is indeed 
facilitating adoption of technology from abroad and creation of appropriate 
domestic technologies. 
 
But their model has an unpleasant implication. If it holds, the estimated 
production elasticity of physical capital should be much larger than its factor 
share because of the presumed externalities. But it is not: the estimated 
regression coefficient of physical capital is pretty close to its expected factor 
share in the range of 30 percent. Therefore, some doubts remain as to the 
usefulness of the new model. Measurement error may be a simple alternative 
explanation for the initial finding of statistically insignificant or even negative 
estimates of the effect of the change in schooling on growth. 
 
This interpretation is supported by a recent econometric reexamination of the 
link between education and growth by Topel (1998), who found that 
measurement errors in education severely attenuate estimates of the effect of the 
change in schooling on GDP growth. At the same time, these measurement 
errors are unlikely to cause a spurious correlation between the initial level of 
schooling and growth conditional on the change in schooling. According to this 
study, both the level and the change in schooling appear to be positively 
correlated with growth. Such a finding could be interpreted as indicating 
externalities from education, but it is difficult to reconcile with the neoclassical 
growth model which does not allow for such externalities in the specifications 
presented above. 
 
In turn, Krueger and Lindahl (1998) explore whether the significant effect of the 
initial level of schooling continues to hold conditional on several theoretical 
restrictions which are implicitly imposed on the underlying growth equation 
which endorses the possible existence of human capital externalities. For   8
instance, they allow the coefficient on education to vary across countries, as 
would be suggested by country-specific empirical results on the rates of return to 
investment in education, and they relax the neither theoretically nor empirically 
substantiated assumption of linearity between the initial level of education and 
growth. Krueger and Lindahl find that the positive statistical effect of the initial 
level of education on growth actually depends on econometric restrictions which 
are not supported by the data. Hence they conclude that despite a voluminous 
theoretical literature highlighting potential externalities from education, the 
empirical evidence of a positive effect of the level of education on a country's 
growth rate is tenuous, probably with the exception of countries at very low 
levels of income. 
 
Mankiw et al. (1992) is the seminal paper using a reduced form of the 
production function in levels and in growth rates (equations (5) and (6)) to 
estimate production elasticities of physical and human capital. In an 
international cross-country analysis, they find production elasticities for both 
human and physical capital of about one third. Although these estimates may 
still suffer from all sorts of econometric problems, they obviously do less so 
than estimates based on the structural form of the production function. 
 
For instance, according to the underlying neoclassical growth theory, the 
investment rate is assumed to be exogenous, so no simultaneity problem arises 
as long as the theory is correct. By implication, the stock variables used in the 
structural form (see equation 11) are necessarily endogenous if the basic 
neoclassical model is right. This is why reduced form estimation should be 
preferred, at least as long as appropriate instruments for the endogenous 
variables are notoriously difficult to come by at the macroeconomic level. 
Moreover, measurement error is likely to play a smaller role because investment 
rates (flows) in the form of schooling enrollment rates are probably better 
proxies for the true human capital variable than accumulated stock variables. 
And if measurement error is less likely to be a problem, so is multicollinearity, 
at least in a cross-country context. 
 
Yet an estimate of the production elasticity of human capital of about one third 
seems to be somewhat on the low side given the previous back-of-the-envelope 
calculations. Using equation (7) which employs average years of schooling 
rather than schooling enrollment rates as a right-hand-side variable, my own 
results indicate that human capital's share in factor income could be about two 
thirds rather than one third (Gundlach 1995). Alternative estimation techniques 
reveal that this finding does not suffer from an upward bias due to the potential 
endogeneity of the stock of human capital. At the same time, the Mankiw et al. 
(1992) finding does not seem to suffer from downward bias due to measurement 
error.   9
 
This outcome may suggest an alternative growth model which is capable of 
explaining both sets of results. However, an unpleasant implication turns up. If 
human capital has a factor share of two thirds and physical capital has a factor 
share of one third, one ends up with a combined physical and human capital 
share of 100 percent. Such a capital share is not compatible with observed rates 
of convergence in the range of 2 percent, which are only supported by a 
combined capital share of about 80 percent (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). 
 
Another extension of the Mankiw et al. framework is suggested by Gemmel 
(1996) who uses an alternative measure of human capital formation based on 
school enrollment rates and labor force data which is intended to distinguish 
between stocks and flows. He finds that initial stocks and subsequent growth of 
human capital play a role in fostering faster economic growth. However, the 
theoretical foundation of the underlying regression equation remains somewhat 
unclear. If both the stock and the flow of human capital are included in the 
regression equation, as could be motivated by endogenous growth models such 
as Romer (1990), it is no longer clear what kind of growth model is actually 
estimated. But if the model to be estimated is not known a priori, the reported 
regression coefficients cannot be interpreted in economic terms. 
 
Accordingly, Gemmel (1996) evaluates his findings solely on the basis of 
statistical significance. Yet statistically significant regression coefficients are not 
necessarily meaningful from an economic point of view even if they have the 
right sign. His estimated regression coefficients on initial income provide a case 
in point, because they have a negative sign and are statistically different from 
zero (compare equation (6)). Unfortunately, they are larger than 1 in absolute 
value. This result is incompatible with the rate of convergence predicted by the 
neoclassical growth model.1 Therefore, this model cannot be used as a 
justification for the specification of the regression equation. But if an 
endogenous growth model is used, initial income should probably have a 
positive regression coefficient or may not enter the regression equation at all. 
 
Heckman and Klenow (1997) use a special variant of equation (9) in a cross-
country context to estimate the macroeconomic return to an additional year of 
schooling. They account for international differences in capital intensity and 
find that the macroeconomic return to an additional year of education seems to 
be close to the microeconomic return in the range of 10 percent as reported in 
the literature (see Psacharopoulos 1994). They interpret their finding as 
indicating that human capital externalities as highlighted by many new growth 
                                                 
1  See the regression coefficient on initial income in equation (6), which has to be smaller than 1 in 
absolute value in order to allow for an estimate of the rate of convergence λ .   10
models do not have a solid empirical basis. However, their interpretation of the 
estimated regression coefficient as a measure of the rate of return is not 
straightforward within the applied production function context such as equation 
(1.1). In that case, the regression coefficient follows as the product of the factor 
share and the rate of return to education, if average years of schooling is used as 
the explanatory variable. Hence the jury is out on the question of human capital 
externalities. 
 
Finally, Gundlach and Matus-Velasco (1999) estimate equation (9) in a cross-
country context by constructing a measure of HS based on world-average rates 
of return to investment in education and by taking into account international 
differences in the quality of schooling as reported by Hanushek and Kim (1995). 
We find that the regression coefficient on our human capital measure is 
statistically indifferent from 1 (as it should) and that the implied estimate of the 
production elasticity of physical capital is about one third, which implies a 
production elasticity of human-capital-adjusted labor of about two thirds. 
Although this estimate cannot be directly compared with the estimates based on 
a production function which models human capital as an independent factor, it 
nevertheless confirms that education seems to play an important role at the 
macroeconomic level. This is all the more important because an important 
macroeconomic role of education has been questioned recently (Pritchett 1996 
and see next section). 
III.  Education in Development Accounting 
As an alternative to econometric estimates of the production elasticity of human 
capital, one may also identify the macroeconomic productivity of education with 
the help of so-called development accounting studies. This approach borrows 
from the older literature on growth accounting but focuses on international 
differences in levels of output per worker, hence development accounting. 
According to recent studies of development accounting by Hall and Jones 
(1999), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), and Prescott (1998), international 
differences in output per worker are difficult to explain by differences in factor 
endowments. These studies attribute a rather small role especially to human 
capital and, accordingly, find large cross-country total factor productivity 
residuals. Large international total factor productivity differences question the 
usefulness of the traditional neoclassical model of growth and development, 
which is based on an exogenous rate of productivity growth. 
 
But these findings deserve second thoughts (Gundlach et al. 1999). First, the 
size of the estimated total factor productivity residual crucially depends on an 
identifying assumption about the specific factor-augmenting properties of 
productivity. The difficulty is that it is impossible to discriminate between the   11
alternative assumptions of Hicks-neutral and Harrod-neutral productivity under 
the standard restrictions imposed on the production function in virtually all 
applied analyses. Hence, residual productivity differences estimated by standard 
development-accounting methods always reflect an untestable a priori 
assumption, which necessarily influences the relative weight of factor inputs and 
productivity in a decomposition of output per worker. Second, large 
international total factor productivity residuals may reflect measurement errors 
or omitted variables. The leading candidate for mismeasurement is the stock of 
human capital. If improved measures of human capital can explain a larger 
fraction of international income differences, this will necessarily reduce the 
residual productivity measure, independent of the chosen productivity 
assumption. 
Theoretical Background 
The inherent problem of a decomposition of output into factor inputs and 
productivity is that it is impossible to discriminate empirically between changes 
in factor inputs that reflect a movement along a given production function and 
changes in total factor productivity (the residual) that reflect a shift of the 
production function. Because total factor productivity is not observed directly, 
one cannot conclude from observations of changes in output per worker and 
changes in factor inputs how changes in total factor productivity might have 
shifted the production function (Nelson 1973). 
 
This problem is also present in development accounting studies, where output 
and factor inputs are measured at a given point in time. Any difference between 
output and the sum of weighted factor inputs, which equals residual 
productivity, obviously depends on the weighting scheme employed. But the 
weighting scheme itself depends on an assumption about the specific neutrality 
properties of total factor productivity (the residual). Within the model, it is a 
question of theory, not empirics, which weighting scheme has to be preferred to 
possible alternatives. 
 
In the older literature on growth accounting,2 the standard practice was to 
assume Hicks-neutral productivity. More recent papers on development 
accounting claim that it is more appropriate to assume Harrod-neutral 
productivity. To compare these identifying assumptions, consider a most simple 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
(10)  ( ) Y K L e = − α α λ 1   , 
 
                                                 
2  For a recent review, see Barro (1999).   12
where  Y  is the level of output, K is the stock of physical capital, L is labor 
used in production, and e
λ denotes productivity. It remains to interpret λ in 
terms of alternative neutrality concepts of productivity.3 
 
Hicks-neutral productivity would leave unchanged the relation between the 
marginal product of labor and the marginal product of capital (the wage-rental 
ratio) for any given capital-labor ratio. The effect of factor accumulation on 
output growth would be measured as the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio. 
Hence Hicks-neutrality amounts to a proportionate increase in K and L at a 
common rate, m: 
 
(11)  () ( )
( )
Ye Ke L mm =
− α α 1
  , 
 
which is equal to equation (10) with λ = m. 
 
Harrod-neutral productivity would leave unchanged the marginal product of 
capital (the rental rate of capital) for any given capital-output ratio. The effect of 
factor accumulation on output would be measured as the growth rate of the 
capital-output ratio. Hence Harrod-neutrality amounts to a purely labor-




YKe L n =
− α α 1
  , 
 
which is equal to equation (10) with λ = n (1 - α). 
 
It follows that Hicks-neutral total factor productivity is equal to Harrod-neutral 
total factor productivity raised to the power of ( ) 1−α  for mn = . That is, 
assuming Harrod-neutrality implicitly gives a larger weight to total factor 
productivity in a decomposition of output than assuming Hicks-neutrality. For 
instance, if log output equals 1 and Harrod-neutral total factor productivity is 
found to explain 90 percent of log output, then, all other things equal, Hicks-
neutral total factor productivity only explains 60 percent of log output if α = 
1/3. Assuming Harrod-neutrality is one of the reasons why recent studies of 
development accounting (Hall and Jones 1999, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 
1997) find a relatively large contribution of total factor productivity. 
 
The motivation for using Harrod-neutrality instead of Hicks-neutrality is based 
on growth theory. The appropriate identifying productivity assumption must be 
                                                 
3  On the following, see, e.g., Allen (1967).   13
consistent with two steady-state requirements of the neoclassical growth model. 
First, since all the variables in the model have to grow at the same rate in the 
steady state, the capital-output ratio must remain constant along a balanced 
steady-state growth path. Second, based on empirical evidence, the factor shares 
of capital and labor must also remain constant in the steady state. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that Harrod-neutral total factor productivity change 
turns out to be the only identifying assumption that is consistent with these 
conditions of a steady state. 
 
While this assertion is true for a general growth model with no specific 
restrictions imposed on the production function, it is a well-known fact that it 
does not hold for a Cobb-Douglas production function. Since the Cobb-Douglas 
production function implies a unit elasticity of substitution, factor shares remain 
constant for any capital-labor ratio and for any capital-output ratio. This is why 
the Cobb-Douglas production function has unequivocal neutrality properties 
(Hahn and Matthews 1964) with regard to productivity shifts.4 
 
When the production function used in a development or growth accounting 
exercise is Cobb-Douglas, as happens to be the case in most applied work, 
neoclassical growth theory does not help to decide whether Hicks- or Harrod-
neutrality should be used as the identifying productivity assumption. This 
insight has long been known, but it seems to have been overlooked in recent 
contributions on development accounting.  
The Empirical Contribution of Education 
Apart from assuming a special variant of total factor productivity, the empirical 
contribution of human capital in explaining international differences in output 
per worker mainly depends on the adequate measurement of international 
differences in education. Measuring human capital as in equation (8), Klenow 
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) as well as Hall and Jones (1999) found that 
education only plays a minor role in explaining international differences in 
output per worker.  
 
However, these studies are not entirely convincing for a number of empirical 
reasons. First, the empirical rate of return to investment in education to be used 
in equation (8) should be based on the so-called full method instead of the 
Mincer-equation, because otherwise a variable age-earnings profile cannot be 
taken into account (Psacharopoulos 1994). Second, what matters for an 
                                                 
4  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Appendix to Ch. 1) claim to prove that productivity shifts 
must be Harrod-neutral in order for the neoclassical model to have a steady state, but 
their formal proof is in fact a demonstration of the steady-state compatibility of both 
Harrod- and Hicks-neutral productivity shifts for the Cobb-Douglas case.   14
economy-wide assessment of education are social rates of return instead of 
private rates. Third, to account for country specific educational differences it 
may be reasonable to use country specific rates of return instead of international 
averages. Fourth, and most importantly, the quality of education as measured by 
student performance at specific grades certainly differs across countries. 
 
To account for international differences in student performance, equation (8) can 
be reformulated as 
 
(8.1)  Ht L te S
r S Q () () =⋅ ⋅⋅   , 
 
where Q is an index of schooling quality which can be calculated on the basis of 
international data on cognitive achievement tests as reported by Hanushek and 
Kim (1995). 
 
To account for the statistical contribution of education, physical capital, and 
total factor productivity (the residual), a covariance method can be used as 
proposed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). In order to provide a point of 
reference, Table 1 first replicates their results, which imply that international 
differences in human capital only account for about 10 percent of the 
international differences in output per worker while international differences in 
total factor productivity account for more than 60 percent. 
 
The second row in Table 1 shows that the statistical contribution of human 
capital doubles if the underlying production function is specified as in Hall and 
Jones (1999) and updated 1990 data are used for a slightly different sample of 
countries. Assuming Hicks-neutrality somewhat reduces the contribution of total 
factor productivity, but at the same time the contribution of human capital falls 
relative to assuming Harrod-neutrality. This outcome simply reflects the 
underlying specification of the production function. First, under Harrod-
neutrality, the statistical contribution of the residual must be larger than under 
Hicks-neutrality (see equations (11) and (12)). Second, given the modeling of 
human capital as directly linked to labor and not as an independent factor of 
production with a constant (human) capital output ratio, international differences 
in human capital formation receive a larger weight under Harrod-neutrality than 
under Hicks-neutrality. 
 
The latter follows because using H as in equation (8) or (8.1) instead of L in 
equation (10), assuming Harrod-neutrality implies that the relative weights of 
factor inputs and total factor productivity in country i  can be estimated in terms 
of output per worker y Y L ≡ /  as 
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with  k K L ≡ /  as the physical capital-labor ratio, h H L ≡ /  as the human 
capital-labor ratio, and Ae i
Harrod n = . By contrast, assuming Hicks-neutrality 
implies that 
 
(14)  ( ) yk h A ii i i
Hicks =
− α α 1   , 
 




− () 1 α
. This shows that in equation (13), human 
capital receives a larger weight relative to physical capital in explaining output 
per worker than in equation (14). 
 
The third line of Table 1 shows that calculating H with country specific social 
rates of return to investment in education rather than with international averages 
for private rates of return as in line 2 does not make a difference for the results, 
probably because country specific measurement errors by and large cancel out 
each other at the aggregate level. But including country specific measures of the 
quality of education as in line 4 of Table 1 raises the statistical contribution of 
human capital in explaining international differences in output per worker to 
about 40 percent under Harrod-neutrality.  
 
These calculations are meant to demonstrate that in the presence of imperfect 
measures of human capital, results on the macroeeconomic role of education 
tend to be highly sensitive with regard to theoretical technology assumptions, 
specific modeling approaches, and estimation procedures. For instance, it can be 
shown that education may account for up to 85 percent of the variation in output 
per worker across OECD countries, which can reasonably be assumed to share 
the same technological level and to provide the most reliable data (Table 1, line 
5). Therefore, recent contributions to development accounting have gone one 
step too far by overstating the importance of total factor productivity differences 
in explaining differences in output per worker. The impact of alternative 
identifying technology assumptions and especially the impact of alternative 
methods of measuring human capital is potentially large. Since macroeconomic 
research cannot provide a clear-cut answer regarding the empirical role of 
human capital up to now, it may be reasonable to look in greater detail into the 
sector which is supposed to produce a large part of the economy-wide stock of 
education, namely the schooling sector. 
IV.  Assessing the Productivity Growth of Schooling   16
In the average OECD country, the schooling sector accounts for larger fractions 
of output and employment than many manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, 
very little is known about the productivity growth of schooling. This lack of 
information should be a matter of concern because changes in the productivity 
of schooling may have a large impact on the labor-market performance of low-
skilled workers, especially in times of fast technological change. 
 
Schooling, like other services, is most likely to be a sector with stagnant 
productivity. The proverbial example of a stagnant-productivity service is a 
haircut, where the consumer is part of the product, the production is labor 
intensive, and the technology is tried and tested. In a way, schooling seems to 
share the same features. The combination of these features hinders productivity 
growth: the resources and the time required to produce a haircut or a unit of 
schooling output may not have changed that much over time, notwithstanding 
changes of fashion. 
Productivity Growth in Schooling: Theory 
The cost-disease model suggested by Baumol (1967) was devised to explain the 
cost problems that will be encountered by any sector with little or zero 
productivity growth. The model describes an economy with two sectors, one 
with rising and the other with constant productivity. An application to the 
schooling sector is straightforward and was already envisaged in the paper by 
Baumol (1967). To keep the theoretical structure as simple as possible, a 
constant amount of labor (L) is assumed to be the only factor of production. The 
two sectors of the model are schooling (S), with constant productivity, and the 
rest of the economy (R) with exponential productivity growth. Output of the two 
sectors can be described by two production functions as 
 
(15)  Y aL S S =     and 
 
(16)  Yb L e RR
rt = ⋅   , 
 
where Yi is the level of output of sector i in time t (t subscripts are omitted), a 
and b are constants, Li is quantity of labor employed in sector i, and r is the 
exogenous rate of sectoral productivity growth that is assumed to be zero in the 
case of schooling. Wages per unit of labor (w) in the economy are determined in 
a competitive labor market and grow according to the sectoral rate of 
productivity growth: 
 
(17)  wc e r t = ⋅   , 
 
where c is a constant.   17
 
Prices in the two sectors are assumed to be set in competitive markets where 
price (p) must equal marginal cost. With only one input, marginal cost is defined 
by the wage divided by the physical marginal product of labor (mpl). The 
physical marginal product is given by the derivative of the production function 
with respect to labor, hence the relative price of schooling follows as 
 
(18)  () p p wm p l wm p l ba e SR S R
r t /( /) / / ( / ) == ⋅   , 
 
which demonstrates that the relative price of the constant-productivity sector 
rises over time in proportion to the exogenous rate of sectoral productivity 
growth r (Inman 1985). Thus, whenever the relative price of that sector rises by 
more than r, its productivity must have declined. 
 
To use the model for an empirical analysis of changes in the productivity of 
schooling, two auxiliary assumptions can be introduced. Assumption 1 is that 
schooling as well as all other service industries exhibit zero productivity growth. 
If so, an estimate of productivity growth in the non-service sector establishes a 
benchmark for the change in the relative price of schooling that would be 
compatible with an efficient allocation of resources. Assumption 2 is that 
comparing the change in the price of schooling with changes in the prices of 
other services allows for an implicit assessment of changes in productivity 
between schooling and other services. Such a comparison would show how 
schooling performed relative to, say, government services or community, social, 
and personal services, which are likely to display stagnant or near-stagnant 
productivity. 
 
Under assumption 1, the economy-wide growth rate of total factor productivity 











S =+     and hence 
 
(20)  r g Y Y TFP R = /( / ) 
 
if productivity growth in services rS (including schooling) is zero, with Y Y S / 
as the output share of services and Y Y R /  as the output share of the residual 
non-service sector. With the price level of economy-wide output (GDP) written 
as 
 
(21)  pp Y Y p Y Y
GDP S S R R =⋅ (/ ) (/ )   , 
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it follows that 
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where Δ indicates an annual rate of change. 
 
Equation (23) clarifies that the true change in the relative price of schooling (and 
other services) will be underestimated if changes in the nominal price of 
schooling are simply deflated by a general price index such as the GDP deflator 
or the CPI deflator (Hanushek and Rivkin 1997). A GDP-deflated change in the 
price of schooling has to be divided by the output share of the residual non-
service sector of the economy before it can be compared with the rate of 
productivity growth in the non-service sector. 
 
Alternatively, a GDP-deflated change in the price of schooling could be directly 
compared with the economy-wide growth rate of total factor productivity, since 
inserting (20) into (23) gives 
 
(24)  ΔΔ p p g S GDP TFP −=   , 
 
which shows that changes in the GDP-deflated price of schooling should equal 
the growth rate of total factor productivity for an efficient allocation of 
schooling resources under assumption 1. 
 
Under assumption 2, the model would be applied only to the service sector. In 
this interpretation, S would indicate schooling as before and R would indicate 
remaining other service sectors. Except for this change in scope, all equations 
could be used as before, with gTFP as the weighted growth rate of total factor 
productivity of schooling and other services. If productivity is constant for all 
service industries (r = 0), the price of schooling relative to other services should 
not change over time since equation (18) would read 
 
(18.1')  ( ) p p wm p l wm p l ba SR S R /( /) / / ( / ) = =   . 
 
All results derived so far under assumptions 1 and 2 depend on a fixed relation 
between schooling output and schooling input. If schooling productivity were 
not constant but rising, the growth rate of total factor productivity would exceed 
the increase in the GDP-deflated price of schooling. By contrast, if schooling 
productivity were declining, the GDP-deflated price of schooling should exceed   19
the economy-wide rate of productivity growth. And if the increase in the relative 
price of schooling exceeds the increase in the relative price of other services, 
productivity growth in schooling would lag behind the typically low rate of 
productivity growth of other service sectors. 
Productivity Growth in Schooling: Empirical Evidence 
The main problem with an empirical estimation of the predicted effects lies with 
a measurement of schooling output over time. Measurement of output in service 
sectors is notoriously difficult because observed expenditure figures are difficult 
to disentangle into price and quality-adjusted quantity components. In this 
regard, measuring schooling output is easier because there are regular external 
measures of schooling output such as student achievement tests that do not rely 
on observed expenditures. However, the available measures of student 
achievement for selected countries have to be transformed into a common 
format before they can be compared over time. 
 
Consistent time-series data on the cognitive achievement of pupils in 
standardized tests are available only for the case of the United States. The 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) began to monitor the 
performance of pupils aged 9, 13 and 17 years in mathematics and science in the 
early 1970s. The NAEP has used the same assessment content and the same 
administration procedures over time, so the reported average test scores of US 
pupils are intertemporally comparable. The US evidence suggests that there has 
been no substantial change in the average performance of US pupils in 1980-
1994 (Hanushek (1997). 
 
In addition to the time series US evidence, test scores in various subjects are 
available for pupils of different age from a number of countries in selected 
years. However, these studies differ with regard to the inclusion of subtests for 
pupils at different ages and they also differ with regard to the sample of 
countries. In addition, direct comparisons of the results of the early 1980s with 
the results of the mid-1990s are not possible because the design of test 
questions, the distribution of difficult and easy questions within a test, and the 
format in which test results are reported has changed. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to calculate changes in the performance of pupils for each country over time 
subject to specific assumptions about the mean and the standard deviation of the 
reported test results because the intertemporally constant performance of US 
pupils can be used as a benchmark in each case (for details of the calculations, 
see Gundlach et al. (1999) and Gundlach and Wößmann (1999)). 
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide results for the calculated changes in the performance of 
pupils from a number of developed and developing countries in natural science 
and in mathematics relative to the constant performance of US pupils. These   20
changes in performance were calculated under different statistical assumptions 
about the mean and the standard deviation of the underlying test results in an 
attempt to account for the heterogeneity of tests. The overall impression from 
these calculations is that the performance of pupils in other countries than the 
US (with the exception of the Philippines) has by and large also remained 
constant. This does not mean that that there are no differences in the 
performance of pupils across countries, but it tends to suggest that existing 
international differences in the performance pupils did not change by much over 
the last 20 years or so. Japanese pupils scored much higher in a recent 
international achievement test than US or German pupils (TIMSS), but they also 
scored higher in the past. 
 
Given that schooling output as measured by the performance of pupils did not 
change (by much), as was assumed by the model presented in the previous 
subsection, it remains to be seen whether the actual spending on schooling 
inputs would be compatible with zero productivity growth. Put differently, the 
question is whether observed changes in the relative price of schooling are 
compatible with the model's theoretical base line of zero productivity growth in 
schooling as discussed in equation (18). 
 
Since total expenditure equals price times quantity, dividing total current 
expenditure on primary and secondary education by the number of pupils 
enrolled equals the nominal price of schooling for a given quality of schooling 
output. To derive a measure of the change in the relative price of schooling, 
several deflators can be used. One possibility to assess productivity change in 
schooling is to compare measures of total factor productivity growth (TFP 
growth) with the GDP-deflated increase in the price of schooling (see equation 
(24)). Using estimates of total factor productivity from a number of different 
sources that match the relevant time periods as closely as possible, the general 
finding is that the increase in the GDP-deflated price of schooling exceeds the 
estimated TFP growth rates by an order of magnitude in all cases except for the 
Philippines (Tables 4 and 5, column (5)). Given that schooling output by and 
large remained constant but fell in the Philippines, this result is inconsistent with 
an efficient allocation of schooling resources in the countries considered. 
 
A second possibility to assess productivity change in schooling is to compare the 
increase in the price of schooling with the increase in the price of comparable 
services. This approach has the advantage that no estimates of total factor 
productivity growth are needed, which are inherently unreliable (as shown in 
section III). The difference between the increase in the price of schooling and 
the averaged increase in the PGS- and the CSPS-deflator is shown in column (6) 
of Tables 4 and 5. Again except for the Philippines, all other countries   21
experienced a substantial rise in the price of schooling relative to the price of 
other services.  
 
The structure of these results across countries is basically the same under both 
measures of productivity change in schooling. The figures imply that it does not 
matter much whether changes in the GDP-deflated price of schooling are 
compared with the growth rate of TFP or whether changes in the price of 
schooling are compared with changes in other services prices. On both counts, 
there is a huge increase in the relative price of schooling which cannot be 
reconciled with an efficient allocation of schooling resources. Hence schooling 
productivity seems to have declined substantially in most countries, and in many 
countries the decline of schooling seems to be much larger than the so-called 
productivity collapse (Hanushek 1997) of US schools. 
V.  Where Do We Stand? 
The idea that education is one of the crucial determinants of growth and 
development appears to be almost self-evident. However, there is surprisingly 
little macroeconomic empirical research which would support this claim. 
Moreover, most recent studies tend to find that there is no large macroeconomic 
productivity effect of education. 
 
On balance, up to now the econometric results do not allow for a clear-cut 
assessment of the macroeconomic role of education in growth. The results that 
come close to a priori expectations of production elasticities share two 
properties. First, a specification of the underlying regression equation that is 
rigorously based on production theory and, second, a functional form of the 
regression equation that tends to reduce econometric problems. Nevertheless, 
most findings reported for the production elasticity of human capital tend to be 
on the low side. Measurement bias is an apparent reason for this result. 
Development accounting exercises confirm that alternative measures of human 
capital can produce an astounding range of estimates. 
 
The more or less unconvincing evidence on the macroeconomic productivity of 
education is somewhat at odds with the strong microeconomic evidence in favor 
of a positive link from education to income. Griliches (1996) provides the most 
plausible economic explanation for the missing macroeconomic link from 
investment in education to growth. He notes that most of the increase in better 
educated workers has been absorbed by the government sector, especially in 
developing countries. The problem is that the government sector, like other sub-
sectors of services, belongs to that part of the economy where output is by and 
large unmeasurable. In fact, output growth in the service sectors is often 
calculated as input growth plus a presumed (low) rate of productivity change.   22
 
That does not mean that government workers and other service sector workers 
do not contribute to overall productivity growth. But it does mean that their true 
contribution to overall productivity growth is unlikely to be reflected by 
conventionally measured GDP data, except for their possible second order 
effects. Second order effects could result from positive spillover effects of 
better-educated government workers who contribute to a more effective 
functioning of the economy in many areas. However, second order effects are 
unlikely to outweigh first order effects. 
 
Another reason for disappointing macroeconomic productivity effects of 
education could be that the schooling sector is unlikely to allocate resources 
efficiently. At least over the last 25 years, the productivity of public schooling in 
several developed and developing countries has declined. The observed 
productivity decline of schooling seems to result from a government decision to 
increase the amount of schooling inputs without controlling for improved 
schooling output. Class sizes have been reduced by increasing the number of 
teachers employed, but the performance of pupils has largely stayed constant (or 
even declined). With inefficient spending, lacking macroeconomic effects of a 
reallocation of resources towards schooling do not come as a surprise. 
 
These findings tend to confirm the positive theory of education expenditure by 
Pritchett and Filmer (1999), who claim that resource allocation in the education 
sector does not follow a constrained output-maximizing rule. They develop a 
behavioral theory of expenditure allocation where educational resource 
allocation is mainly determined through rent seeking, and not through 
competitive markets. With regard to educational policies, this theory and the 
presented international evidence implies that instead of further increasing the 
level of spending on education, the structure of decision making and the 
incentives within the education sector have to be changed in order to improve 
the productivity of schooling. 
 
The most pressing question for further research regards the very existence and 
the actual size of positive externalities of education, which are emphasized by 
many new growth theories. The fact that all countries choose to subsidize 
education seems to support the idea that education does generate positive 
externalities. But the question remains whether present subsidies to education 
are too high, too low, or just right. The large microeconometric literature on 
private and social rates of return to education cannot answer the question how 
large education externalities actually may be. Macroeconomic research on this 
issue is just beginning (Heckman and Klenow 1997). So my best summary is 
that we do not know as much as we need to know to identify the macroeconomic 
productivity of education, not to speak of the macroeconomic productivity of the   23
broader concept of human capital. Only within the education sector, the picture 
appears to be more clear-cut: it seems that allowing for more competition at all 
levels of education could help to avoid declining productivity of schooling.   24
References 
Allen, R. G. D. (1967). Macro-Economic Theory. A Mathematical Treatment. 
London. 
Barro, Robert J. (1999). Notes on Growth Accounting. Journal of Economic 
Growth 4: 119-137. 
Barro, Robert J., Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992), Convergence. Journal of Political 
Economy 100: 223-251. 
Barro, Robert J., Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995). Economic Growth. New York. 
Baumol, William J. (1967). Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The 
Anatomy of Urban Crisis. American Economic Review 57 (3): 415-426. 
Benhabib, Jess, Mark M. Spiegel (1994). The Role of Human Capital in 
Economic Development: Evidence from Aggregate Cross-Country and 
Regional U.S. Data. Journal of Monetary Economics 34: 143-173. 
Bils, Mark, Peter J. Klenow (1998). Does Schooling Cause Growth or the Other 
Way Round? NBER Working Paper, 6393, February. 
Gemmel, Norman (1996). Evaluating the Impacts of Human Capital Stocks and 
Accumulation on Economic Growth: Some New Evidence. Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics 58: 9-28. 
Griliches, Zvi (1996). Education, Human Capital and Growth: A Personal 
Perspective. NBER Working Paper, 5426, January. 
Gundlach, Erich (1995). The Role of Human Capital in Economic Growth: New 
Results and Alternative Interpretations. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 131: 
383-402. 
Gundlach, Erich (1999). Die Produktivität der Bildung. Die Weltwirtschaft, H. 
3: 345-367. 
Gundlach, Erich (1999). The Impact of Human Capital on Economic 
Development: Problems and Perspectives. In: Joseph Tan (Ed.), Human 
Capital Formation as an Engine of Growth: The East Asian Experience. 
ISEAS, Singapore: 7-33. 
Gundlach, Erich, Desmond Rudman, Ludger Wößmann (1998). Second 
Thoughts on Development Accounting. Kiel Institute of World Economics, 
Working Paper, 895, December. 
Gundlach, Erich, Ludger Wößmann (1999). The Fading Productivity of 
Schooling in East Asia. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Working Paper, 
945, September. 
Gundlach, Erich, Ludger Wößmann, Jens Gmelin (1999). The Decline of 
Schooling Productivity in OECD Countries. Kiel Institute of World   25
Economics, Working Paper, 926, May (forthcoming Economic Journal, 
Conference Issue 2001). 
Gundlach, Erich, Ximena Matus-Velasco (1999). Labor Productivity in 
Different Climatic Zones. Kiel Institute of World Economics (mimeo). 
Hahn, Frank H., R. C. O. Matthews (1964). The Theory of economic Growth: A 
Survey. Economic Journal 74: 779-902. 
Hall, Robert E., Charles I. Jones (1999). Why do Some Countries Produce So 
Much More Output per Worker than Others? Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 114: 83-116. 
Hanushek, Eric A. (1997). The Productivity Collapse in Schools. In: William 
Fowler, jr. (ed.), Developments in School Finance 1996. U.S: Department 
of Education , National Center for Education Statistics. Washington, D.C.: 
183-195. 
Hanushek, Eric A., Dongwook Kim (1995). Schooling, Labor Force Quality, 
and Economic Growth. NBER Working Paper, 5399. December. 
Hanushek, Eric A., Steven G. Rivkin (1997). Understanding the Twentieth-
Century Growth in U.S. School Spending. Journal of Human Resources 32: 
35-68. 
Heckman, James J., Peter J. Klenow (1997). Human Capital Policy. University 
of Chicago (mimeo). 
Inman, Robert P. (1985). Introduction and Overview. In: Robert P. Inman (Ed.), 
Managing the Service Economy. Prospects and Problems. Cambridge MA: 
1-24. 
Kim, Jong-Il, Lawrence J. Lau (1992). Human Capital and Aggregate 
Productivity: Some Empirical Evidence from the Group-of-Five Countries. 
Stanford University, September (mimeo). 
Klenow, Peter J., Andrés Rodriguez-Clare (1997). The Neoclassical Revival in 
Growth Economics: Has it Gone Too Far?. NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 12: 73-102. 
Krueger, Allan B., Mikael Lindahl (1998). Education for Growth: Why and For 
Whom? Princeton University, September (mimeo). 
Lau, Lawrence J., Dean T. Jamison, Frederic F. Louat (1991). Education and 
Productivity in Developing Countries. World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Papers, 612, March. 
Lucas, Robert E., jr. (1988). On the Mechanics of Economic Development. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 22: 3-42. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, David N. Weil (1992), A Contribution to 
the Empirics of Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 408-437.   26
Mincer, Jacob (1974). Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. New York. 
Nelson, Richard R. (1973). Recent Exercises in Growth Accounting: New 
Understanding or Dead End? American Economic Review 63 (3): 462-468. 
Prescott, Edward C. (1998). Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity. 
International Economic Review 39: 525-552. 
Pritchett, Lant (1996). Where Has All the Education Gone? World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper, 1581, March. 
Pritchett, Lant, Deon Filmer (1999). What Education Production Functions 
Really Show: A Positive Theory of Education Expenditures. Economics of 
Education Review 18: 223 239. 
Psacharopoulos, George (1994). Returns to Investment in Education: A Global 
Update. World Development 22: 1325-1343. 
Romer, Paul M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political 
Economy 89 (5,2): 71-102. 
Topel, Robert (1998). Labor Markets and Economic Growth. University of 
Chicago (mimeo). Forthcoming in: Orley Ashenfelter, David Card (Eds.), 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Amsterdam.   27
 Table 1:  Education in Development Accountinga 
Technology assumption  Harrod-neutrality  Hicks-neutrality 
























2. Hall and Jones 
(1999)c 
0,22 0,19 0,59 0,15 0,46 0,39 
3. with country specific 
social rates of return 














4. with average social 
rates of return to 
investment in 
education and country 



















5. like line 4., but OECD 
countries only 
0,87 0,15  -0,02 0,58 0,43  -0,01 
aAverage fraction of the international variation in output per worker that can be explained by 
factor inputs or by the residual; in percent (covariance method). Line 1: 98 countries, 1985 
data. Line 2-4: 131 countries, 1990 data. Line 5: 23 countries, 1990 data. 
 
Source: Gundlach (1999).   28
Table 2:  Changes in Schooling Output in OECD Countries, 1970-1994a 
  H1  H2  H3 
 Science  Ma&Sc  Science Ma&Sc Science Ma&Sc 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Australia  94.3 97.7 94.4 97.8 94.9 98.1 
Belgium  95.8 95.3 95.7 95.4 95.5 96.7 
France  88.2 93.4 87.9 93.4 86.6 93.6 
Germany  96.0 95.2 96.2 95.4 97.8 97.1 
Italy  99.7 101.3 99.7 101.3  100.1  101.4 
Japan  97.2 98.1 97.3 98.3 97.5 99.3 
Netherlands  103.5 101.7 103.7 101.9 105.7 103.5 
New  Zealand  87.9 90.3 87.8 90.3 87.7 90.5 
Sweden  104.3 104.3 104.5 104.5 105.9 105.6 
United  Kingdom  94.3 91.8 94.4 92.1 95.1 93.6 
United  States  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
aIndex of schooling output based on the performance of pupils in standardized 
international achievement tests relative to the performance of US pupils; 1970=100. 
Source: Gundlach et al. (1999). 
 
Table 3:  Changes in Schooling Output in East Asia, 1980-1994a 
    H1     H2     H3  
 Science  Math Average  Science  Math Average Science.  Math. Average 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Hong  Kong  92.6 96.0 94.4 92.6 96.7 94.8 94.6  101.5  98.2 
Japan  95.5 94.1 94.7 96.0 94.7 95.3 97.5 98.7 98.1 
Philippines  78.6 n.a. 78.6 76.8 n.a. 76.8 78.3 n.a. 78.3 
Singapore 101.7 n.a. 101.7  101.9 n.a. 101.9  104.5 n.a. 104.5 
South Korea  101.9 n.a. 101.9  102.4 n.a. 102.4  102.2 n.a. 102.2 
Thailand  88.6 103.1 95.7  88.1 102.8 95.3  90.5 101.0 95.7 
aIndex of schooling output based on the performance of pupils in standardized 
international achievement tests relative to the performance of US pupils; 1970=100. 
Source: Gundlach and Wößmann (1999).   29
Table 4:  Schooling Productivity Growth in OECD Countries, 1973-1989 
  ΔpS  gTFP  Δ Δ p p SG D P −   ΔpPGS CSPS ,   Change in 
schooling 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)=(2)-(3)  (6)=(4)-(1) 
Canada 9.2  0.3  3.4  7.6  -3.1  -1.6 
France 12.1  1.4  5.0  7.2  -3.6  -4.9 
Germany 8.1 0.9  4.2  5.0  -3.3  -3.1 
Italy 16.3  0.6  5.0  12.9 -4.4  -3.4 
Japan 9.3  1.1 5.2  6.4  -4.1  -2.9 
United 
Kingdom 
12.5 0.7  3.5  -  -2.8  - 
United 
States 
7.8 0.3  2.5  6.6  -2.2  -1.2 
Source: Gundlach et al. (1999). 
 
Table 5:  Schooling Productivity Growth in East Asia, 1980-1994 
  ΔpS  gTFP  Δ Δ p p SG D P −   ΔpPGS CSPS ,   Change in 
schooling 




   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)=(2)-(3)  (6)=(4)-(1) 
Hong Kong  15.4  1.7  7.1  10.2  -5.4  -5.2 
Japan 6.1  0.9 4.5  3.1  -3.6  -3.0 
Philippines 13.8  -0.8  0.8  14.1  -1.6  0.3 
Singapore 9.2 2.2  6.1  5.0  -3.9  -4.2 
South Korea  18.0 2.3  11.0  10.8  -8.7  -7.2 
Thailand 13.3  2.0  8.8  5.7  -6.8  -7.6 
Source: Gundlach and Wößmann (1999). 